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Florian Klo¨ck∗ Alexander Schied∗∗ Yuemeng Sun‡
Abstract
For a market impact model, price manipulation and related notions play a role that is similar
to the role of arbitrage in a derivatives pricing model. Here, we give a systematic investigation into
such regularity issues when orders can be executed both at a traditional exchange and in a dark
pool. To this end, we focus on a class of dark-pool models whose market impact at the exchange
is described by an Almgren–Chriss model. Conditions for the absence of price manipulation for
all Almgren–Chriss models include the absence of temporary cross-venue impact, the presence of
full permanent cross-venue impact, and the additional penalization of orders executed in the dark
pool. When a particular Almgren–Chriss model has been fixed, we show by a number of examples
that the regularity of the dark-pool model hinges in a subtle way on the interplay of all model
parameters and on the liquidation time constraint. The paper can also be seen as a case study for
the regularity of market impact models in general.
Key Words: Price manipulation, transaction-triggered price manipulation, nonnegative expected liquidation
costs, dark pool, market impact model, optimal trade execution, optimal liquidation
1 Introduction
Recent years have seen a mushrooming of alternative trading platforms called dark pools. Orders
placed in a dark pool are not visible to other market participants (hence the name) and thus do not
influence the publicly quoted price of the asset. Thus, when dark-pool orders are executed against a
matching order, no direct price impact is generated, although there may be certain indirect effects.
Dark pools therefore promise a reduction of market impact and of the resulting liquidation costs. They
are hence a popular platform for the execution of large trades.
Dark pools differ from standard limit order books in that they do not have an intrinsic price finding
mechanism. Instead, the price at which orders are executed is derived from the publicly quoted prices
at an exchange. Thus, by manipulating the price at the exchange through placing suitable buy or sell
orders, the value of the “dark liquidity” in the dark pool can be altered. For this reason, dark pools
have drawn significant attention by regulators; see IOSCO (2011). We refer to Mittal (2008) and for
a practical overview on dark pools and some related issues of market manipulation. More information
on the practical background of our analysis is given in the excellent survey article Lehalle (2013) and
the recent book Lehalle et al. (2013).
Our first main goal in this paper is to conduct a systematic mathematical analysis of market
manipulation by means of a dark pool. To this end, we study the mathematical concept of price
manipulation as introduced by Huberman and Stanzl (2004) as well as some other, related regularity
concepts. Huberman and Stanzl (2004) introduced the notion of price manipulation in the framework
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of a generic market impact model. They argue that by repeating suitably rescaled price manipulation
strategies one can generate so-called quasi-arbitrage, which can be regarded as some kind of statistical
arbitrage. In this sense, the absence of price manipulation can be viewed as a specific no-arbitrage
condition for market impact models. Its existence can indicate problems with the model at hand; for
instance, the optimal trade execution problem may not be well-posed, because optimal strategies may
not exist. Our main results will show in particular that, for our dark-pool model, price manipulation
can only be excluded by rather unrealistic choices of model parameters. This happens despite the fact
that we choose a rather restrictive class of strategies, which excludes the most notorious predatory
strategies such as “fishing” (Mittal, 2008). We believe that our findings can be interpreted so as to
provide some support for the general concerns expressed over market manipulation possibilities with
dark pools (IOSCO, 2011; Mittal, 2008).
Our second main goal is to provide a case study for the regularity analysis of market impact
models in general. As explained above, the notion of price manipulation for a market impact model
has been proposed as some analogue of the notion of arbitrage for an asset price model. But while
arbitrage and many related concepts have been studied throughout decades in the context of asset
pricing models, the study of the regularity or irregularity of market impact models is just at its
beginning; see Gatheral and Schied (2013) for a recent survey. We therefore investigate here several
additional regularity conditions besides the absence of price manipulation. These notions include
transaction-triggered price manipulation as introduced in Alfonsi et al. (2012), and the new concept
of nonnegative expected liquidation costs, which was introduced independently by Roch and Soner
(2011). In particular, in Section 4.2 we will see that for certain choices of model parameters some of
these notions may be violated while others are not, and the situation can actually become relatively
complex. We hope that our analysis can thus provide some additional insight into the various existing
notions of regularity and their relations. Further studies of the regularity of market impact models are
given in Gatheral (2010), Alfonsi and Schied (2010), Alfonsi et al. (2012), Alfonsi and Infante Acevedo
(2012), and Klo¨ck (2012), to mention only a few.
We use a stochastic model for trade execution at two possible venues: a dark pool and an exchange.
It is a natural model, because it extends the standard Almgren–Chriss market impact model for
exchange prices (Bertsimas and Lo, 1998; Almgren and Chriss, 2001; Almgren, 2003) by a generic
dark pool with a fairly general flow of incoming orders. It is possible to understand this dark pool
as the aggregation of all available dark pools, when there are several such venues in the market. The
problem of optimally routing dark-pool orders within a collection of dark pools has been analyzed in
Laruelle et al. (2011).
The optimal trade execution problem for orders placed in a dark pool and at an exchange has been
considered before by Kratz and Scho¨neborn (2010). Their model, however, only allows for quadratic
transaction costs for orders placed at the exchange. In particular Kratz and Scho¨neborn (2010) ex-
clude any temporary or transient price impact components. This exclusion of genuine price impact
components is not just made out of mathematical convenience: Our results show that any inclusion of
price impact will lead to the existence of profitable price manipulation strategies unless the remaining
model parameters are chosen in an extreme manner, and these price manipulation strategies will have a
significant impact on the possible existence and structure of optimal execution strategies. In particular
the simple recipes found by Kratz and Scho¨neborn (2010) will no longer work in a genuine market im-
pact model; see also Propositions 7.1 and 7.2 in Kratz and Scho¨neborn (2010).Kratz and Scho¨neborn
(2012) have recently extended their previous results to continuous time, but still exclude genuine price
impact components from their model.
In Section 4.1, our first main result characterizes completely those models from our class that
are sufficiently regular for all underlying Almgren–Chriss models, either in the sense of the absence
of price manipulation or in terms of the new condition of nonnegative expected liquidation costs.
The critical quantities will be the size of “slippage” and the degrees of permanent and temporary
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cross-venue impact. In Section 4.2, we then investigate the existence of model irregularities for special
model characteristics. It will turn out that the generation of such irregularities hinges in a subtle
way on the interplay of all model parameters and on the liquidation time constraint. In Section 4.3
we illustrate in a simplified setting that our regularity condition guarantees the existence of optimal
trade execution strategies, and we show how such strategies can be computed.
The paper is organized as follows. In the subsequent Section 2 we introduce the model and
formulate our standing assumptions. In Section 3 we review and discuss several notions for the
regularity of a market impact model, namely the absence of standard and transaction-triggered price
manipulation and the new condition of nonnegative expected liquidation costs. Our main results are
stated in Section 4 and proved in Section 6. We conclude in Section 5.
2 Model setup
In Section 2.1 we recall the basic notions of the well-known Almgren–Chriss model (Bertsimas and Lo,
1998; Almgren and Chriss, 2001) in the form of Almgren (2003) and introduce (fairly general) condi-
tions we will impose on its parameters. In Section 2.2 we will explain how a dark pool can be added
to this model and how admissible trading strategies can be defined. In Section 2.3 we will define
the liquidation costs associated with an admissible trading strategy. The total costs will comprise
some obvious expense terms and certain additional, indirect costs. As explained in the Introduc-
tion, Kratz and Scho¨neborn (2010, 2012) have proposed a model for trading in a dark pool and at
an exchange but they force their model to be free of price manipulation strategies by excluding all
permanent or transient price impact components and only consider quadratic transaction costs. One
of our main goals here is to understand the effects that arise when a genuine market impact model is
used to describe the price impact of orders executed at the exchange.
2.1 The Almgren–Chriss model
In the Almgren–Chriss market impact model, it is assumed that the number of shares in the trader’s
portfolio is described by an absolutely continuous trajectory t 7→ Xt, the trading strategy. Given this
trading trajectory, the price at which transactions occur is
Pt = P
0
t + γ(Xt −X0) + h(X˙t). (1)
Here, P 0t is the unaffected stock price process. The term γ(Xt − X0) corresponds to the permanent
price impact that has been accumulated by all transactions until time t. It is usually assumed to be
linear in Xt−X0 with γ denoting a positive constant, because linearity guarantees the absence of price
manipulation; see Huberman and Stanzl (2004) or Gatheral (2010). See also Almgren et al. (2005) for
an empirical analysis and justification of this assumption. The term h(X˙t) describes the temporary or
instantaneous impact of trading X˙t dt shares at time t and only affects this current order. It can also
comprise other direct or indirect costs, which are often called “slippage”; see Section 2.2 in Gatheral
(2010). The most common choices in the literature are linear impact, h(x) = ηx, or more generally
power-law impact of the form h(x) = η sgn(x)|x|ν for two constants η ≥ 0 and ν > 0. Here we will
consider general functions h that are subject to the following definition.
Definition 2.1. A function h : R → R will be called an impact function if it is continuous, strictly
increasing, satisfies h(0) = 0, and is such that f(x) = xh(x) is convex.
Assumption 2.2. We assume that the unaffected stock price process (P 0t )t≥0 is a ca`dla`g martingale
on a filtered probability space (Ω,F , (Ft),P) for which F0 is P-trivial. Moreover, the permanent-
impact parameter γ is strictly positive, and h is an impact function. An Almgren–Chriss model is
thus defined in terms of the parameters (γ, h, P 0).
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The condition that P 0 is a martingale is a standard assumption in the market impact literature.
One reason is that drift effects can be ignored due to the usually short trading horizons. In addition,
we are interested here in the qualitative effects of price impact on the stability of the model. A nonzero
drift would lead to the existence of profitable “round trips” that would have to be distinguished from
price manipulation strategies in the sense of Huberman and Stanzl (2004) (see Definition 3.1 below).
2.2 An Almgren–Chriss model with dark pool
The Almgren–Chriss model is a market impact model for exchange-traded orders. We will now extend
this model by allowing the additional execution of orders in a dark pool. A dark pool is an alternative
trading venue in which unexecuted orders are invisible to all other market participants. In this dark
pool, buy and sell orders are matched and executed at the current price at which the asset is traded
at the exchange.
In addition to a trading strategy executed at the exchange, investors can place an order of X̂ shares
into the dark pool at time t = 0. This order will be matched with incoming orders of the opposite side.
These orders arrive at random times 0 < τ1 < τ2 < . . . and we denote the size of incoming matching
orders by Y˜1, Y˜2, . . . > 0. We consider only those orders that are a possible match. That is, the Y˜i
will describe sell orders when X̂ > 0 is a buy order and buy orders when X̂ < 0 is a sell order. In
addition, the investor can set a minimum quantity level1 Ξ ∈ [0, |X̂ |]. Then all incoming orders Y˜i of
size Y˜i ≥ Ξ will be matched piece by piece with the order X̂ until it is cancelled or completely filled.
That is,
Yi :=

sgn(X̂)Y˜i, if Y˜i ≥ Ξ and
∑i−1
j=1 Yj + Y˜i ≤ |X̂|,
X̂ − sgn(X̂)∑i−1j=1 Yj, if Y˜i ≥ Ξ and ∑i−1j=1 Yj ≤ |X̂| and ∑i−1j=1 Yj + Y˜i > |X̂ |,
0, otherwise,
is the part of the incoming order that is actually executed against the remainder of X̂. By defining
the counting process associated with the arrival times (τk),
Nt := max{k ∈ N | τk ≤ t}, (2)
the amount of shares that have been executed in the dark pool until time t can be conveniently denoted
by
Zt :=
Nt∑
i=1
Yi. (3)
By (Gt) we denote the right-continuous filtration generated by (Ft), Z, and (τi ∧ t)t≥0 for i = 1, 2, . . . .
In the first part of the paper, we make some very mild assumptions on the laws and interdependence
of the random variables (τi), (Y˜i), and P
0:
Assumption 2.3. We assume the following conditions:
(a) 0 < τ1 <∞ P-a.s., and λ0 := inf
0<δ≤1
1
δ
P[ τ1 ≤ δ ] > 0.
(b) For all x > 0 we have λ1(x) := inf
δ>0
P[ Y˜1 ≥ x | τ1 ≤ δ ] > 0.
(c) P 0 is a martingale also under the filtration (Gt) generated by (Ft), Z, and (τi ∧ t)t≥0 for i =
1, 2, . . . .
1Restricting the size of a matching order by setting a minimum quantity level M is a common feature in many
real-world dark pools. For instance, it helps to protect against “fishing” by predatory traders; see Mittal (2008).
4
Condition (a) means that the intensity for the arrival of the first matching order is bounded away
from zero. Condition (b) states that for all x > 0 there is a positive probability that the first incoming
matching order has at least size x, conditional on the event that {τ1 ≤ δ}. This latter condition
can be relaxed, but we use it in this form to keep our assumptions simple. The requirement that
P 0 is a (Gt)-martingale allows (τi) and (Y˜i) to depend on P 0 in an arbitrary manner but, conversely,
limits the dependence of P 0 on these random variables. This limitation is entirely natural, since below
we will explicitly model the indirect cost impact of fills in the dark pool on order executions at the
exchange via (10). Note that all conditions in Assumption 2.3 are satisfied in particular when τ1 has
an exponential distribution, (τi), (Y˜i), and P
0 are independent random variables, and Y˜1 is unbounded
from above, as we will assume in the second part of the paper.
Now we consider an investor who must liquidate an initial asset position of X0 ∈ R shares during
the time interval [0, T ]. The problem of how to do this in an optimal fashion is known as the optimal
trade execution problem; see, e.g., Go¨kay et al. (2011), Lehalle (2013), Gatheral and Schied (2013),
and the references therein.
In the extended dark pool model, the investor will first place an order of X̂ ∈ R shares in the
dark pool2 and then choose a liquidation strategy of Almgren–Chriss-type for the execution of the
remaining assets at the exchange. This latter strategy must be absolutely continuous in time. It
will thus be described by a process (ξt) that parameterizes the speed by which shares are sold at the
exchange. Moreover, until fully executed, the remaining part of the order X̂ can be cancelled at a
(possibly random) time ρ < T . Hence, the number of shares held by the investor at time t is
Xt := X0 +
∫ t
0
ξs ds+ Z
ρ
t−, (4)
where Zρt− denotes the left-hand limit of Z
ρ
t = Zρ∧t.
Definition 2.4. Let an initial position X0 ∈ R and a liquidation horizon T > 0 be given. An
admissible trading strategy is a quadruple χ := (X̂,Ξ, ξ, ρ) where X̂ ∈ R is the size of the dark-pool
order, Ξ ∈ [0, |X̂ |] is the minimum quantity level, the cancellation time ρ is a (Gt)-stopping time such
that ρ < T P-a.s., and the trading strategy ξ is a (Gt)-predictable process whose integral,
∫ t
0 ξs ds, is
P-a.s. bounded uniformly in t and ω. In addition, the liquidation constraint
X0 +
∫ T
0
ξt dt+ Zρ = 0 (5)
must be P-a.s. satisfied. The set of all admissible strategies for given X0 and T is denoted by X (X0, T ).
Due to (4) and (5), the terminal asset position of any admissible strategy is XT = 0, since our
requirement ρ < T implies that ZρT− = Zρ.
Suppose that the admissible trading strategy χ = (X̂,Ξ, ξ, ρ) is used. As in (1), the price at which
assets can be traded at the exchange is defined as
Pχt = P
0
t + γ
∫ t
0
ξs ds+ h(ξt). (6)
The price at which the ith incoming order is executed in the dark pool will be
P̂χτi = P
0
τi + γ
∫ τi
0
ξs ds + κh(ξτi), (7)
2If at time t = 0 the dark pool contains an order Y˜0 of the opposite side, then the investor could fill this order
immediately and then start liquidating the remaining asset position X0 − Y˜0, maybe by resizing the dark-pool order.
Therefore we can assume that the dark pool does not contain a matching order at t = 0. Moreover, restricting the
placement of dark-pool orders to t = 0 lets us exclude so-called ‘fishing’ strategies; see Remark 3.5 below.
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where
κ ≥ 0.
That is, we take as price Pχτi from (6) but allow the temporary price impact, κh(ξτi), to be different
from h(ξτi). This assumption is natural for at least two reasons. First, as explained above and in
Section 2.2 of Gatheral (2010), the temporary price impact is often used to describe also direct or
indirect transaction costs (“slippage”) that do not arise from a change in the exchange-quoted price.
When this is the case, (6) will be a virtually adjusted price that does not fully coincide with the
actual exchange-quoted price, and so the price P̂χτi for dark-pool executions needs to be adjusted
correspondingly. Second, and more importantly, the continuous-time Almgren–Chriss model is an
approximation to a discrete-time reality in which the temporary price impact describes that part
of the price impact of a child order which has already decayed by the time the next child order is
placed (Almgren and Chriss, 2001, Section 1.3). So, unless an execution in the dark pool happens
instantaneously after a child order is placed at the exchange, the price of the dark-pool execution will
not receive the full temporary price impact generated by the preceding child order. Thus, for both
reasons explained above, it is natural to allow that only a fraction of the temporary price impact
component h(ξt) is affecting the price at which orders in the dark pool are executed. This argument
suggests to take κ ∈ [0, 1]. The mathematical arguments, however, work for general κ ≥ 0, and so we
will not require κ ≤ 1 in the sequel.
2.3 The costs associated with an admissible strategy
Let us now introduce the costs associated with an admissible trading strategy χ = (X̂,Ξ, ξ, ρ) ∈
X (X0, T ). The total costs will consist of several components. The first component is given by∫ T
0
ξtP
χ
t dt. (8)
This term is standard within the Almgren–Chriss setting and simply describes the accumulated ex-
penses from buying ξt dt shares at price P
χ
t at each time t. Similarly, the next term describes the
accumulated expenses from buying Yi shares at price P̂
χ
τi whenever there is a fill in the dark pool:
Nρ∑
i=1
YiP̂
χ
τi . (9)
Besides these expenses, there can also be certain indirect costs associated with the usage of a dark
pool. First, when our order X̂ gets a fill in the dark pool, the counterparty’s matching order takes our
liquidity from the dark pool. Without the presence of our liquidity in the dark pool, the counterparty
may have executed at least part of their order at the exchange, where it would have generated—
possibly favorable—permanent price impact. We therefore assume that each Yi would have generated
the permanent price impact −αγYi at the exchange, where α ∈ [0, 1] describes the fraction of Yi that
would have been executed at the exchange had our order X̂ not been placed. This impact would have
influenced all future prices at the exchange and, in turn, also at the dark pool. This reasoning leads
to the definition of the following indirect cost component:
αγ
( ∫ T
0
Zρt ξt dt+
Nρ∧T∑
i=1
Zτi−Yi
)
. (10)
Finally, we propose to take into account additional “slippage” generated by an execution in the dark
pool. Besides actual transaction costs or taxes, this slippage may comprise hidden costs that relate to
dark pool executions and that are extremely difficult to model explicitly. For instance, one can think
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of costs arising from the phenomena of adverse selection or “fishing”; see Mittal (2008) and Remark
3.5. Moreover, due to the covert nature of dark pools, data may be sparse so that there will be a high
degree of model uncertainty. In applied financial engineering, a slippage cost term can thus also serve
as a penalization of dark-pool orders in view of possible model misspecification. We assume that for
each execution Yi the resulting cost component is given by β(Yi)Yi, where β is an impact function in
the sense of Definition 2.1. This leads to a cost term the form
Nρ∑
i=1
β(Yi)Yi. (11)
So to speak, the factor α models the “virtual permanent price impact” generated by a dark pool
execution, whereas the impact function β describes the corresponding “temporary price impact” effect.
Let us summarize the assumptions and definitions we made so far:
Definition 2.5. The dark-pool extension of a given Almgren–Chriss model (γ, h, P 0) is defined in
terms of the new parameters
(α, β, κ, (τi), (Y˜i)),
where α ∈ [0, 1], β is an impact function, κ ≥ 0, and the sequences (τi) and (Y˜i) satisfy Assumption
2.3. In the extended model, the costs associated with an admissible strategy χ = (X̂,Ξ, ξ, ρ) are given
by
CχT = X0P 00 +
∫ T
0
ξtP
χ
t dt+ αγ
∫ T
0
Zρt ξt dt+
Nρ∑
i=1
Yi
(
P̂χτi + αγZτi− + β(Yi)
)
. (12)
In (12), the costs CχT are defined as the sum of the initial face value, X0P 00 , and the expense and
cost terms (8)—(11). So, for a short position X0 < 0, CχT is the amount by which the actual expenses
exceed the amount −X0P 00 . Similarly, for a long position X0 > 0, CχT is the amount by which the
revenues of the strategy χ fall short of the face value X0P
0
0 . When it is clear from the context which
strategy χ = (X̂,Ξ, ξ, ρ) is used, or when considering generic strategies, we often simply write CT
instead of CχT .
3 Price manipulation
Our first main concern in this paper is to investigate the stability and regularity of the dark-pool
extension in dependence on the parameters (γ, h, P 0) and (α, β, g, (τi), (Y˜i)). This question is analogous
to establishing the absence of arbitrage in a derivatives pricing model, where absence of arbitrage is a
necessary condition for the pricing of contingent claims by replication.
But there must also be a difference in the notions of regularity of a derivatives pricing model and
of a market impact model. In a derivatives pricing model, one is interested in constructing strategies
that almost surely replicate a given contingent claim, and this is the reason why one must exclude the
existence of arbitrage opportunities defined in the usual almost-sure sense. In a market impact model,
one is interested in constructing optimal trade execution strategies. These strategies are not defined in
terms of an almost-sure criterion but as minimizers of a cost functional of a risk averse investor. Com-
monly used cost functionals involve expected value as in Bertsimas and Lo (1998) and Gatheral (2010),
mean-variance criteria as in Almgren and Chriss (2001), expected utility as in Schied and Scho¨neborn
(2009), or alternative risk criteria as in Forsyth et al. (2012) and Gatheral and Schied (2011). There-
fore, also the regularity conditions to be imposed on a market impact model need to be formulated in
a similar manner. To make such regularity conditions independent of particular investors preferences,
it is reasonable to formulate them in a risk-neutral manner. The first condition that was proposed in
this context is the following.
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Definition 3.1 (Huberman and Stanzl (2004)). A round trip is an admissible trading strategy with
X0 = 0. A price manipulation strategy is a round trip that has strictly negative expected costs,
E[ CT ] < 0.
Of course, costs can be regarded as negative revenues and vice versa. Thus, the existence of price
manipulation strategies allows to make a positive expected profit by exploiting one’s own price impact.
Huberman and Stanzl (2004) argue that by rescaling and repeating price manipulation strategies in
their model, one can generate so-called quasi-arbitrage, which can be viewed as some kind of statistical
arbitrage. Conversely, any quasi-arbitrage strategy yields a price manipulation strategy. In this sense,
the absence of price manipulation can be regarded as a specific no-arbitrage condition for market
impact models. Moreover, when the costs are a convex functional of an trade execution strategy,
as it is often the case, the existence of price manipulation precludes the existence of optimal trade
execution strategies for risk-neutral investors, because one can generate arbitrarily large expected
revenues by adding a multiple of a price manipulation strategy. One can see easily that in most
cases the same argument also works for risk-averse investors provided that risk aversion is small
enough. Kratz and Scho¨neborn (2010) mention the problem of price manipulation in a dark-pool
model and give some preliminary results but no systematic analysis. Analyses of the absence of price
manipulation in various other market impact models were given by Huberman and Stanzl (2004),
Gatheral (2010), Alfonsi and Schied (2010), Alfonsi et al. (2012), Alfonsi and Infante Acevedo (2012),
and Klo¨ck (2012), to mention only a few; see Gatheral and Schied (2013) for a recent overview.
It was observed in Alfonsi et al. (2012) that the absence of price manipulation may not be sufficient
to guarantee the stability of the model, because optimal trade execution strategies can still oscillate
strongly between alternating buy and sell trades, a property one should exclude for various reasons. For
instance, such trading strategies may be considered illegal when performed by a broker who is executing
a trade on behalf of a client. See also the discussions in Alfonsi et al. (2012) and Gatheral and Schied
(2013). This was the reason for introducing in Alfonsi et al. (2012) the notion of transaction-triggered
price manipulation, which informally means that the expected execution costs of a sell (buy) program
can be decreased by intermediate buy (sell) trades. In our specific situation, this idea can be made
precise as follows.
Definition 3.2. There is transaction-triggered price manipulation if there exists X0 ∈ R, T > 0, and
a strategy (X̂,Ξ, ξ, ρ) ∈ X (X0, T ) for which either X̂ or some ξt have the same sign as X0 and that
has strictly higher expected revenues than all strategies (X̂ ′,Ξ′, ξ′, ρ′) ∈ X (X0, T ) for which both X̂ ′
and ξ′t have always the opposite sign of X0.
We will also consider the following notion of regularity, which was introduced independently in
Roch and Soner (2011):
Definition 3.3. The model has nonnegative expected liquidation costs if for all X0 ∈ R, T > 0, and
every admissible strategy χ ∈ X (X0, T ),
E[CχT ] ≥ 0. (13)
Condition (13) states that on average it is not possible to make a profit beyond the face value of
a position out of the market impact generated by one’s own trades. We have the following hierarchy
of regularity conditions in our model.
Proposition 3.4. (a) If there is no transaction-triggered price manipulation then the model has
nonnegative expected liquidation costs.
(b) If the model has nonnegative expected liquidation costs, then there is no price manipulation.
Implication (a) holds for every market impact model in which buy orders increase the price and
sell orders decrease the price. Implication (b) clearly holds for every market impact model.
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Remark 3.5. A common price manipulation strategy is the so-called “fishing” strategy in dark pools;
see Mittal (2008). In a fishing strategy, agents first send small orders to dark pools so as to detect
dark liquidity. Once a dark-pool order is detected, the visible price at the exchange is manipulated
for a short period in a direction that is unfavorable for that order. Finally, an order is sent to the
dark pool so as to be executed against the dark liquidity at the manipulated price.
Here, we are not interested in the profitability of such predatory fishing strategies but primarily
in the stability and regularity of optimal trade execution algorithms in dark pool and exchange. We
therefore exclude fishing strategies by allowing the placement of orders in the dark pool only at time
t = 0. Allowing for the placement of dark-pool orders at times t > 0 will lead to a larger class
X˜ (X0, T ) ⊃ X (X0, T ) of admissible strategies. Since clearly
inf
χ∈X˜ (X0,T )
E[ CχT ] ≤ inf
χ∈X (X0,T )
E[ CχT ],
the conditions of no-price manipulation or of nonnegative expected liquidation costs will be violated
as soon as they are violated in our present setting. But one of the main economic consequences of
our main results, as stated in the subsequent section, is that these conditions are typically violated
for the smaller class X (X0, T ) when model parameters are realistic. Therefore, they are also typically
violated for any larger class of strategies.
4 Results
An Almgren–Chriss model is specified by the parameters (γ, h, P 0) satisfying Assumption 2.2. Its
extension incorporating a dark pool is based on the additional parameter set (α, β, κ, (τi), (Y˜i)), which
will always be assumed to satisfy Assumption 2.3. We are interested in the conditions we need to
impose on these parameters such that the extended market model is regular. Here, regularity refers
to the absence of price manipulation and related notions as explained in the preceding section.
4.1 General regularity results
Our first result characterizes completely those parameters (α, β, g, (τi), (Y˜i)) for which the dark-pool
extension of every Almgren–Chriss model is sufficiently regular for all time horizons.
Theorem 4.1. For given (α, β, κ, (τi), (Y˜i)), the following conditions are equivalent.
(a) For any Almgren–Chriss model and all T > 0, the dark-pool extension has nonnegative expected
liquidation costs.
(b) For any Almgren–Chriss model and every time horizon T > 0, the dark-pool extension does not
admit price manipulation.
(c) We have α = 1, κ = 0, and
|β(y)| ≥ γ
2
|y| for all y ∈ R. (14)
Remark 4.2. Let us comment on the three conditions in part (c) of the preceding theorem.
(i) The requirement α = 1 means that an execution of a dark-pool order must generate the same
virtual permanent impact on the exchange-quoted price as a similar order that is executed at
the exchange. In view of the discussion preceding (11), virtual price impact generated by the
execution of a dark-pool order can be understood in terms of a deficiency in opposite-price
impact.
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(ii) The requirement κ = 0 means that temporary impact from trades executed at the exchange must
not affect the price at which dark-pool orders are executed. Note that our notion of admissibility
of strategies excludes short-term manipulation of the exchange-quoted price in simultaneous
response of the arrival of a matching order in the dark pool, because (Gt)-predictability basically
allows ξt to depend on Yτi only for t > τi. Therefore the requirement κ = 0 is quite surprising.
Also, according to the discussion following (7), one should expect that the price of a real-world
dark pool should take at least some fraction of temporary price impact into account, i.e., one
should expect κ > 0 for real-world dark pools.
(iii) Condition (14) means that the execution of a dark-pool order of size Yi needs to generate
“slippage” of at least γ2Y
2
i . This latter amount is just equal to the costs from permanent impact
one would have incurred by executing the order at the exchange. With this amount of slippage,
savings by executing an order not at the exchange but at a dark pool only arise from savings on
temporary impact but not on permanent impact. It seems that dark pools that are currently
operative do not charge transaction costs or taxes of this magnitude. Nevertheless, our theorem
states that a penalization of size β(Yi)Yi ≥ γ2Y 2i is needed for a robust stabilization of the model
against irregularities.
Remark 4.3. The implication (b)⇒(c) in Theorem 4.1 is proved by constructing price manipulation
strategies for the cases in which some of the conditions in (c) are not satisfied. Most of these price
manipulation strategies involve only a small order X̂ placed in the dark pool and another small order
stream (ξt) used for manipulating the exchange-quoted price until an execution in the dark pool occurs
or a certain deadline ρ passes. Afterwards, the remaining inventory is liquidated at the exchange over
a time period [ρ, T ] that is sufficiently large for the resulting temporary price impact to be small.
Since order sizes are small, so will be the inventory remaining at time ρ. So, even if we formally send
T to infinity in the proofs, choosing T in the range of seconds or minutes may be sufficient for similar
strategies to work in practice. The price manipulation we use in our proofs may actually have some
similarity with some strategies used by high-frequency arbitrageurs. The only exception of the rule of
small order sizes occurs when proving (14) for large |y|, because then we will need to place a dark-pool
order X̂ = y. Nevertheless, it is easily possible to require an upper limit ŷ > 0 on the admissible size
|X̂| of dark pool orders and obtain a variant of Theorem 4.1 in which (14) is required only for |y| ≤ ŷ.
Theorem 4.1 gives a complete characterization of the regularity of a dark-pool extension when
the underlying Almgren–Chriss model (γ, h, P 0) and the possible time horizon may change. In fact,
we only need to alter the parameters h and T . If all parameters are fixed, the situation becomes
more involved. The following two propositions give some implications that hold in the generality of
Assumption 2.3. The first general proposition deals with the “slippage parameter” β(·).
Proposition 4.4. Suppose an Almgren–Chriss model with parameters (γ, h, P 0) and its dark-pool
extension (α, β, κ, (τi), (Y˜i)) have been fixed. When there is no price manipulation for a given time
horizon T > 0, then
β(y)y ≥ γ
(
α− 1
2
)
y2 + yh(−y/T ) for all y. (15)
In particular, we must have that
|β(y)| ≥ γ
(
α− 1
2
)
|y| for all y (16)
when there is no price manipulation for all T > 0.
The next proposition deals with the parameters α and κ under the additional assumption that
there is equality in (16). This equality implies in particular that α ≥ 1/2 and that “slippage” has the
minimal value that is necessary to exclude price manipulation.
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Proposition 4.5. Suppose that an Almgren–Chriss model with parameters (γ, h, P 0) and its dark-pool
extension (α, β, κ, (τi), (Y˜i)) have been fixed. Suppose moreover that there is equality in (16) and that
there is no price manipulation for all T > 0. Then α = 1 and κ = 0.
In the next section, we will analyze the regularity of a concrete class of dark-pool extensions of a
fixed Almgren–Chriss model. We will see that the question of regularity exhibits a rich mathematical
structure and that the absence of price manipulation can no longer be characterized solely in terms of
α, β, and κ. For instance, it will follow from Corollary 4.13 that even in the case α = β = 0 it may
happen that there is no price manipulation for all T > 0, but this situation is then characterized in
terms of relations between γ, h, and the law of τ1.
4.2 Regularity and irregularity for special model characteristics
In this section, we will investigate in more detail the regularity and irregularity of a dark-pool extension
of a fixed Almgren–Chriss model. To this end, we will assume throughout this section that slippage
is zero, β = 0, which is the natural (naive) first guess in setting up a dark-pool model. We know
from Theorem 4.1, though, that there must be some Almgren–Chriss model such that there is price
manipulation for sufficiently large time horizon T .
First, we will look into the role played by T in the existence of price manipulation. We will argue
that there exists a critical threshold T ∗ ≥ 0 such that there is no price manipulation for T < T ∗ but
price manipulation does exist for T > T ∗. We will show that all three cases T ∗ = ∞, 0 < T ∗ < ∞,
and T ∗ = 0 can occur. Second, we will analyze the stronger requirements of absence of transaction-
triggered price manipulation and of nonnegative expected liquidation costs. We will find situations in
which there is no price manipulation for all T > 0 but where the condition of nonnegative expected
liquidation costs fails and where there is transaction-triggered price manipulation for sufficiently large
T .
The results in this section serve a two-fold purpose. First, they illustrate that the question of reg-
ularity for a dark-pool extension of an Almgren–Chriss model can become quite subtle when condition
(c) from Theorem 4.1 is not satisfied. Second, this section also provides a case study for the regularity
of market impact models in general.
We will make the following simple but natural assumption on the dark-pool extension defined
through (α, β, g, (τi), (Y˜i)). Note that part (b) of the following assumption implies all parts of As-
sumption 2.3.
Assumption 4.6. We assume the following conditions throughout Section 4.2.
(a) Slippage is zero: β = 0.
(b) The process (Nt), as defined in (2), is a standard Poisson process with parameter θ > 0 and (Y˜i)
are i.i.d. random variables with common distribution µ on (0,∞] such that µ([x,∞]) > 0 for all
x > 0. We also assume that the stochastic processes (P 0t ), (Nt), and (Y˜i) are independent.
In Assumption 4.6 (b) we do not exclude the possibility that Y˜i takes the value +∞ with positive
probability. The particular case Y˜i = +∞ P-a.s., corresponding to µ = δ∞, can be regarded as a
convenient description of the limiting case of infinite liquidity of incoming dark-pool orders.
In Propositions 4.7 and 4.9, we will consider the situation in which α = 1. In view of our assumption
β = 0, Proposition 4.4 implies that there will be price manipulation for sufficiently large T . The
following proposition shows in particular that one then can also generate arbitrarily negative expected
costs. In contrast to the situation in many other market impact models, this conclusion is not obvious
in our case, because our expected costs are typically not a convex functional of admissible strategies.
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Proposition 4.7. Suppose that an Almgren–Chriss model has been fixed and that α = 1. Then, for
any X0 ∈ R,
lim
T↑∞
inf
χ∈X (X0,T )
E[ CχT ] = −∞.
In particular, the condition of nonnegative expected liquidation costs is violated.
Now we examine in more detail the role played by T in the existence of price manipulation. First,
we show that for a certain class of models there is no price manipulation for small T .
Proposition 4.8. Let κ = 0 and h(x) = ηx. If T ≤ 2ηγ , then there is no price manipulation. If
moreover α = 1, then there is no price manipulation if and only if T ≤ 2ηγ .
Since the class X (X0, T ) of admissible strategies increases with T , the existence of price manip-
ulation for some T implies the existence of price manipulation for any T ′ ≥ T . Hence there exists a
critical value T ∗ such that there is no price manipulation for T < T ∗ but price manipulation does exist
for T > T ∗. For α = 1 and linear temporary impact, h(x) = ηx, it follows from Proposition 4.8 that
T ∗ = 2ηγ . The next proposition shows that T
∗ = 0 for α = 1 and temporary impact with sublinear
growth.
Proposition 4.9. Suppose that an Almgren–Chriss model has been fixed and that α = 1. If h has
sublinear growth, i.e.,
lim
|x|→∞
h(x)
x
= 0,
then there is price manipulation for every T > 0.
After having considered the case α = 1, we will assume in the sequel that
α = 0, κ = 0, and h(x) = ηx, (17)
in addition to Assumption 4.6. Note that we assume κ = 0 since this is one of the conditions required
by Theorem 4.1 for regularity. Taking κ > 0 will typically make the model even less regular. The
assumption α = 0 can again be regarded as the natural (naive) first guess in setting up a dark-pool
model. But in view of Theorem 4.1 the assumption α = 0 implies the existence of an Almgren–Chriss
model for which there is price manipulation and for which the condition of nonnegative expected
liquidation costs is violated for sufficiently large T . Our aim is to give a refined analysis for the
specific class of Almgren–Chriss models with linear temporary price impact, h(x) = ηx, which is
probably the most commonly studied case in the academic market impact literature. We first take a
look at the condition of nonnegative expected liquidation costs.
Proposition 4.10. Consider a fixed Almgren–Chriss model and suppose that condition (17) holds.
(a) If γη < 2θ, we have for any X0 ∈ R \ {0},
lim
T↑∞
inf
χ∈X (X0,T )
E[ CχT ] ≤ −
γ2
2
X20
1
2ηθ − γ < 0. (18)
(b) If either γη = 2θ and X0 6= 0 or γη > 2θ, then
lim
T↑∞
inf
χ∈X (X0,T )
E[ CχT ] = −∞.
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In particular, the condition of nonnegative expected liquidation costs is violated in both parts
of Proposition 4.10. Proposition 3.4 therefore yields that there is also transaction-triggered price
manipulation. In fact, the next proposition shows that price manipulation and negative expected liq-
uidation costs can only be realized by using transaction-triggered price manipulation. Therefore, only
a strategy that manipulates the exchange-quoted price can be more profitable than other strategies.
Proposition 4.11. Consider a fixed Almgren–Chriss model and suppose that condition (17) holds. If
X0 ≥ 0 and ξt ≤ 0 for all t (or X0 ≤ 0 and ξt ≥ 0 for all t), then E[ CT ] ≥ 0, i.e., the violation of
nonnegative expected liquidation costs in Proposition 4.10 can only be achieved by intermediate buy
(sell) trades at the exchange during an overall sell (buy) program.
Some of the preceding results can be strengthened in the limiting case µ = δ∞, which corresponds
to infinite liquidity of incoming dark-pool orders. We first show that then (18) becomes an equality.
Proposition 4.12. Consider a fixed Almgren–Chriss model. Suppose moreover that condition (17)
holds and that µ = δ∞. Then, for X0 ∈ R and γη < 2θ,
lim
T↑∞
inf
χ∈X (X0,T )
E[ CχT ] = −
γ2
2
X20
1
2ηθ − γ . (19)
Equation (19) is remarkable, because it implies on the one hand that the condition of nonnegative
expected liquidation costs is violated for all X0 6= 0. By taking X0 = 0 we see, on the other hand, that
there is no price manipulation for all T > 0 and so T ∗ =∞. We actually have the following result:
Corollary 4.13. Consider a fixed Almgren–Chriss model. Suppose moreover that condition (17) holds
and that µ = δ∞. Then there is no price manipulation for every T > 0 if and only if γη ≤ 2θ.
By comparing the preceding result with Propositions 3.4 and 4.12, we arrive at the following
statement.
Corollary 4.14. Under the assumptions of Corollary 4.13 there is always transaction-triggered price
manipulation for sufficiently large T . Standard price manipulation, however, exists only for γη > 2θ.
4.3 Optimal trade execution strategies
In this section, we illustrate some of our results by determining an optimal strategy for selling X0 > 0
shares. To this end, we will make a number of simplifying assumptions, because our main goal is
to analyze the regularity of the model. In particular, our optimality criterion is the minimization of
expected costs; we do not consider risk aversion.
We fix an Almgren–Chriss model and assume that Assumption 4.6 (b) holds and that
α = 1, β(y) =
γ
2
y, κ = 0. (20)
Then Theorem 4.1 guarantees that there is no price manipulation. For simplicity, we will also assume
that all matching dark-pool orders are large compared to our’s in the sense that
µ = δ∞. (21)
Then the entirety of the dark-pool order X̂ will either be filled when τ1 ≤ ρ or it will be cancelled
when τ1 > ρ. In this setting, an admissible strategy χ = (X̂,Ξ, ξ, ρ) ∈ X (X0, T ) will be called a
single-update strategy if ρ is a deterministic time in [0, T ) and ξ is predictable with respect to the
filtration generated by the stochastic process 1{τ1≤t}, t ≥ 0. Due to (21), the value of Ξ is irrelevant.
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Note that the process ξ of a single-update strategy evolves deterministically until there is an
execution in the dark pool, i.e., until time τ1. At that time, ξ can be updated. But the update will
only depend on the time τ1 and not on any other random quantities. In particular, ξ can be written
as
ξt =
{
ξ0t , if t ≤ τ1 or τ1 > ρ,
ξ1t , if t > τ1 and τ1 ≤ ρ,
(22)
where ξ0 is deterministic and ξ1 depends on τ1.
Proposition 4.15. Suppose that Assumption 4.6 (b), (20), and (21) hold and that |h(x)| → ∞ as
|x| → ∞. For any X0 ∈ R and T > 0 there exists a single-update strategy that minimizes the expected
costs E[ CχT ] in the class of all admissible strategies χ ∈ X (X0, T ). Moreover, the part ξ1 of any optimal
single-update strategy must satisfy
ξ1t =

−Xτ1 − X̂
T − τ1 on {τ1 ≤ ρ},
−Xρ
T − ρ on {ρ < τ1};
(23)
Now we show how the components ξ0, X̂, and ρ of an optimal single-update strategy can be
computed. To this end, we make the additional simplifying assumption that temporary impact is
linear, h(x) = ηx. It follows from Equation (40) in the proof of Proposition 4.15 that the expected
costs of a single-update strategy χ ∈ X (X0, T ) satisfying (23) are given by
E[ CχT ] =
1
2
γX20 +
∫ ρ
0
η(ξ0s )
2e−θs ds+ηe−θρ
(X0 +
∫ ρ
0 ξ
0
s ds)
2
T − ρ +
∫ ρ
0
ηθe−θt
(X0 +
∫ t
0 ξ
0
s ds+ X̂)
2
T − t dt (24)
A standard calculation shows that X0t := X0 +
∫ t
0 ξ
0
s ds, 0 ≤ t ≤ ρ, minimizing this expression is the
solution of the Euler–Lagrange equation
−X¨0t + θX˙0t + θ
X0t + X̂
T − t = 0
with initial condition X00 = X0 and a terminal condition X
0
ρ that will be determined later. By using
the computer algebra software Mathematica, we found the analytic solution
X0t = −X̂+(
θTeθT (T − ρ)(Ei(−Tθ)− Ei(θ(ρ− T )))− ρ+ T (1− eθρ)
)−1{
− eθtρX0
+(t− T )(X0eθρ −X0ρ − X̂)+ θ(T − t)eθT [Ei((t− T )θ)(T (X0 −X0ρ − X̂)
−ρX0) +X0(ρ− T )Ei(θ(ρ− T )) + T (X0ρ + X̂)Ei(−Tθ)
]
+ eθtT (X0 −X0ρ − X̂)
}
,
where Ei(t) =
∫ t
−∞ s
−1es ds is the exponential integral function. The constants ρ, X̂ and X0ρ can then
be determined by optimizing the expression (24) numerically.
5 Conclusion
We have analyzed the regularity of a class of dark-pool extensions of an Almgren–Chriss model and
found that such models admit price manipulation strategies unless the model parameters satisfy certain
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restrictions. The corresponding parameter values will typically differ strongly from values found in
empirical analysis or calibration of real-world dark pools. Our results can therefore provide some
indication that dark pools may create market inefficiencies and disturb the price finding mechanism
of markets.
In concrete realizations of our model, we have furthermore provided a comparative analysis of
various regularity notions for market impact models. We have found that the validity of these notions
can depend in a subtle way on the interplay of all model parameters and on the liquidation time
constraint.
6 Proofs
Recall from Assumption 2.3 that the martingale property of (P 0t ) is retained by passing to the enlarged
filtration (Gt). Next, for an admissible strategy χ = (X̂,Ξ, ξ, ρ), the asset position process X defined
in (4) is an admissible integrand for P 0 since it is bounded and (Gt)-predictable, because X is both
left-continuous and (Gt)-adapted. Recall also that f(x) = xh(x).
Lemma 6.1. The costs of an admissible strategy χ = (X̂,Ξ, ξ, ρ) for given X0 and T are given by
CχT = −
∫ T
0
Xt dP
0
t +
γ
2
(
X0 +
Nρ∑
i=1
Yi
)2
+
∫ T
0
f(ξt) dt
+
Nρ∑
i=1
Yi
(
γ
∫ τi
0
ξs ds− γαXτi+ + κh(ξτi) + β(Yi)
)
.
Proof. First we prove that
∫ T
0
ξtP
0
t dt+
Nρ∑
i=1
YiP
0
τi = −X0P 00 −
∫ T
0
Xt dP
0
t . (25)
To this end, we use first (5) and integration by parts to get
X0P
0
0 +
∫ T
0
Xt dP
0
t = X0P
0
0 +
∫ T
0
(
X0 +
∫ t
0
ξs ds+ Z
ρ
t−
)
dP 0t
= X0P
0
0 +X0(P
0
T − P 00 ) +
∫ T
0
∫ t
0
ξs ds dP
0
t +
∫ T
0
Zρt− dP
0
t
= −P 0TZρT− −
∫ T
0
ξtP
0
t dt+ Z
ρ
TP
0
T −
∫ T
0
P 0t− dZ
ρ
t − [P 0, Z]t.
Since ρ < T the two terms −P 0TZρT− and ZρTP 0T− cancel each other out. Moreover, the definition (3)
of Z implies that
∫ T
0
P 0t− dZ
ρ
t + [P
0, Z]t =
Nρ∑
i=1
P 0τi−Yi +
Nρ∑
i=1
∆P 0τiYi =
Nρ∑
i=1
P 0τiYi.
Putting everything together yields (25).
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Therefore, P-a.s.,
CχT = X0P 00 +
∫ T
0
ξtP
χ
t dt+ αγ
∫ T
0
Zρt ξt dt+
Nρ∑
i=1
Yi
(
P̂χτi + αγZτi− + β(Yi)
)
= X0P
0
0 +
∫ T
0
ξt
(
P 0t + γ
∫ t
0
ξs ds+ h(ξt)
)
dt+ αγ
∫ T
0
Zρt ξt dt
+
Nρ∑
i=1
Yi
(
P 0τi + γ
∫ τi
0
ξs ds+ κh(ξτi) + αγ
i−1∑
j=1
Yj + β(Yi)
)
= −
∫ T
0
Xt dP
0
t + γ
∫ T
0
∫ t
0
ξs ds ξt dt+
∫ T
0
f(ξt) dt+ γα
Nρ∑
i=1
Yi
∫ T
τi
ξt dt
+
Nρ∑
i=1
Yi
(
γ
∫ τi
0
ξs ds+ κh(ξτi) + αγ
Nρ∑
j=i+1
Yj + β(Yi)
)
= −
∫ T
0
Xt dP
0
t +
γ
2
(∫ T
0
ξt dt
)2
+
∫ T
0
f(ξt) dt
+
Nρ∑
i=1
Yi
(
γ
∫ τi
0
ξs ds+ γα
( ∫ T
τi
ξt dt+
Nρ∑
j=i+1
Yj
)
+ κh(ξτi) + β(Yi)
)
= −
∫ T
0
Xt dP
0
t +
γ
2
(
X0 +
Nρ∑
i=1
Yi
)2
+
∫ T
0
f(ξt) dt
+
Nρ∑
i=1
Yi
(
γ
∫ τi
0
ξs ds− γαXτi+ + κh(ξτi) + β(Yi)
)
.
In the last step, we have again used the fact that XT = XT+ = 0 P-a.s.
Proof of Proposition 3.4. (a): Assume X0 ≥ 0, and let the trading strategy be sell-only, i.e. ξt ≤ 0 for
all t and Yi ≤ 0 for all i. Then in particular Pχt ≤ P 0t for all t and P̂χτi ≤ P 0τi for all i. From (25) we
get that
CT ≥ X0P 00 +
∫ T
0
ξsP
0
s ds+
NT∧ρ∑
i=1
YiP
0
τi = −
∫ T
0
Xt dP
0
t .
Since (P 0) is a (Gt)-martingale by Assumption 2.3 (c) and Xt is bounded according to Definition 2.4,
we have E[ CT ] ≥ 0 for such a trading strategy. Absence of transaction-triggered price manipulation
implies that the expected costs cannot be decreased by intermediate sell trades. Therefore E[ CχT ] ≥ 0
for all admissible trading strategies χ. The case X0 ≤ 0 works analogously.
(b): By setting X0 = 0 in (13) we find that E[ CχT ] ≥ 0 for round trips χ.
In the following, we will consider round trips χ = (X̂,Ξ, ξ, ρ) that cancel the order in the dark
pool after the first execution, i.e. X0 = 0 and there exists some r < T such that
ρ := τ11{τ1≤r and Y˜1≥Ξ} + r1{τ1>r or Y˜1<Ξ}. (26)
We will also take
Ξ = |X̂ | (27)
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and the following class of strategies ξ, which depend only on τ1 and Y˜1:
ξt = −x1[0,r](t) +
rx
T − r1(r,T ](t) · 1{τ1 > r or Y˜1 < Ξ} +
rx− X̂
T − r 1(r,T ](t) · 1{τ1 ≤ r and Y˜1 ≥ Ξ}. (28)
With Lemma 6.1 we find that the costs of such a single-update round trip χ = (X̂,Ξ, ξ, ρ) are
CχT = −
∫ T
0
Xt dP
0
t + rf(−x) + (T − r)f
( rx
T − r
)
1Ac + (T − r)f
(rx− X̂
T − r
)
1A
+1AX̂
(γ
2
X̂ + γXτ1− − γα(Xτ1− + Y1) + κh(ξτi) + β(Y1)
)
,
where A = {τ1 ≤ r and Y˜1 ≥ X̂}. Consequently, the expected costs of χ are
E[ CχT ] = rf(−x) + (T − r)f
( rx
T − r
)
P[ τ1 > r or Y˜1 < |X̂ | ] (29)
+E
[
(T − r)f
(rx− X̂
T − r
)
+ φ(X̂)− γ(1− α)τ1xX̂ + κh(−x)X̂ ; τ1 ≤ r and Y˜1 ≥ |X̂ |
]
,
where
φ(y) :=
γ
2
y2 − αγy2 + β(y)y. (30)
Proof of Proposition 4.4. We first prove the inequality (15), which can also be written as φ(y) ≥
yh(−y/T ) for φ is as in (30). Suppose by way of contradiction that there exists some y such that that
φ(y) < yh(−y/T ) but that there is no price manipulation. Consider the single-update round trip with
X̂ = y, minimum quantity level Ξ = |X̂ |, cancellation time r ∈ (0, T ), and x = 0 in (28). By (29), the
expected costs of this strategy are
E[ CT ] =
(
φ(y)− yh
( −y
T − r
))
P
[
τ1 ≤ r and Y˜1 ≥ Ξ
]
.
When r is sufficiently small, our assumption φ(y) < yh(−y/T ) implies that the right-hand side will
be strictly negative, and so there will be price manipulation. But this is the desired contradiction.
Inequality (16) now follows by sending T to infinity and using the continuity of h(x) at x = 0.
Proof of Proposition 4.5. To prove κ = 0, we assume by way of contradiction that κ > 0. As before,
we take a single-update round trip with (27), (28), and X̂, x 6= 0 such that both X̂ and x have the
same sign and |X̂ | ≤ 1. Since there is equality in (16), we have φ(y) = 0 for all y. When sending T to
infinity in (29), we thus get with dominated convergence that
lim
T↑∞
E[ CT ] = rf(−x) + E
[
− γ(1− α)xτ1X̂ + κh(−x)X̂ ; τ1 ≤ r and Y˜1 ≥ |X̂|
]
≤ −h(−x)(rx− κX̂rλ0λ1(1)),
which is strictly negative for arbitrary X̂ > 0 and sufficiently small x > 0. Hence there is price
manipulation for sufficiently large T . This proves κ = 0.
Now we prove that we must have α = 1. We assume α < 1 by way of contradiction and let r = 1,
x > 0, X̂ ∈ (0, 1] in (29). We also use the already established fact that κ = 0. Sending T to infinity
yields that
lim
T↑∞
E[ CT ] = rf(−x) + E
[
− γ(1− α)xτ1X̂ ; τ1 ≤ r and Y˜1 ≥ |X̂|
]
≤ −x
(
rh(−x) + γ(1− α)X̂ E[ τ1; τ1 ≤ r and Y˜1 ≥ 1 ]
)
.
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Again, the latter expression is strictly negative for arbitrary X̂ and sufficiently small x. This proves
that there is price manipulation for sufficiently large T and in turn establishes α = 1.
The function f(x) = xh(x) is convex according to Assumption 2.2 and Definition 2.1. Hence, f
admits left- and right-hand derivatives, f ′−(x) and f ′+(x), which are nondecreasing functions of x.
Lemma 6.2. Let h be an impact function and f(x) := xh(x). Then f(x) is differentiable at x = 0
with f ′(0) = 0. Moreover, f ′±(x)→ 0 as x→ 0.
Proof. First note that we have
f(x)− f(0)
x− 0 =
f(x)
x
= h(x) −→ 0 as x→ 0. (31)
Hence, f is differentiable at x = 0 with f ′(0) = 0. Moreover it is well known that for a convex function
f we have f ′±(x)→ f ′(x0) when f is differentiable at x0.
Proof of Theorem 4.1. The implication (a)⇒(b) follows immediately by taking X0 = 0.
(b)⇒(c): We already know from Proposition 4.4 that we must have (16), which yields (14) when
α = 1. Thus, it remains to show that κ = 0 and α = 1.
We start by showing that κ = 0. To this end, we assume by way of contradiction that there
is no price manipulation but κ > 0. When the function φ defined in (30) is identically zero, this
result follows from Proposition 4.5. Otherwise, we will now construct a suitable impact function h
so that there is price manipulation. To this end, we can assume without loss of generality that φ
is strictly convex—if not, we can replace β by another impact function β˜ with |β˜| ≥ |β| for which
φ˜(y) := γ(12 − α)y2 + yβ˜(y) is strictly convex and satisfies φ˜ ≥ φ ≥ 0. By the same argument, we
may assume without loss of generality that β, and hence also φ, are differentiable on R \ {0} and that
ϕ(y) = γ(12 − α)y + β(y) is an impact function in the sense of Definition 2.1. Now we define
f(x) :=
∫ |x|
0
√
φ′(
√
y) dy.
This definition makes sense, because the derivative φ′ of the convex function φ : R→ [0,∞) is bounded
on every compact interval. Then f has a strictly increasing derivative and hence is strictly convex.
Also, f(x) ≥ 0 with equality if and only if x = 0. Since f is strictly convex,
h(x) :=
f(x)
x
=
f(x)− f(0)
x− 0 , x 6= 0
is strictly increasing in x and continuous on R \ {0}. Moreover, it satisfies h(0) := limx→0 h(x) = 0,
because
|h(x)| = 1|x|
∫ |x|
0
√
φ′(
√
y) dy ≤ sup
0≤y≤|x|
√
φ′(
√
y) =
√
φ′(
√
|x|) −→ 0
as x→ 0 by Lemma 6.2. Therefore, h is an impact function in the sense of Definition 2.1. Moreover,
for ϕ(x) = φ(x)/x,
0 ≤ lim
x↓0
ϕ(
√
x)
−h(−x) = limx↓0
√
xφ(
√
x)
f(−x) = limx↓0
√
xφ(
√
x)
f(x)
= lim
x↓0
(√
xφ(
√
x)
)′
f ′(x)
= lim
x↓0
1
2
√
x
φ(
√
x) + 12φ
′(
√
x)√
φ′(
√
x)
≤ lim
x↓0
√
φ′(
√
x) = 0, (32)
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where we have used l’Hopital’s rule in the third step and, in the inequality, the following estimate,
which holds by the convexity of φ:
φ(
√
x) =
∫ √x
0
φ′(y) dy ≤ √xφ′(√x).
Now we take x ∈ (0, 1], X̂ := √x, and send T to infinity in (29) to get
lim
T↑∞
E[ CT ] = rf(−x) + E
[
φ(
√
x)− γ(1− α)x3/2τ1 + κh(−x)
√
x; τ1 ≤ r and Y˜1 ≥
√
x
]
≤ −rxh(−x) + φ(√x) + κh(−x)√xrλ0λ1(1)
= −√xh(−x)
(
r
√
x+
ϕ(
√
x)
−h(−x) − κrλ0λ1(1)
)
.
By (32), the term in parenthesis, and hence the entire right-hand side, becomes strictly negative when
x is sufficiently small, and so there is price manipulation. This shows that we must have κ = 0.
Now we prove that we must have α = 1 when there is no price manipulation for any time horizon.
To this end, we assume by way of contradiction that α < 1. We fix an arbitrary impact function h1
and let h := εh1 for ε > 0. We also set x := 1 and take X̂ ∈ (0, 1]. Sending ε to zero and T to infinity
in (29) yields that
lim
T↑∞
lim
ε↓0
E[ CT ] = E
[
φ(X̂)− γ(1− α)X̂τ1; τ1 ≤ r and Y˜1 ≥ X̂
]
≤ X̂
(
ϕ(X̂)− γ(1 − α)E[ τ1; τ1 ≤ r and Y˜1 ≥ 1 ]).
But since ϕ(X̂) ↓ 0 as X̂ ↓ 0, the term in parenthesis, and hence the entire right-hand side, will be
strictly negative when X̂ is sufficiently small. Hence, we cannot have α < 1 when there is no price
manipulation for all Almgren–Chriss models.
(c)⇒(a): Assume that α = 1, κ = 0, and that (16) holds. Note that∫ τi
0
ξs ds −Xτi+ = −
i∑
j=1
Yi −X0. (33)
With Lemma 6.1 we get for the costs of an admissible strategy (X̂,Ξ, ρ, ξ)
CχT = −
∫ T
0
Xt dP
0
t +
γ
2
(
X0 +
Nρ∑
i=1
Yi
)2
+
∫ T
0
f(ξt) dt+
Nρ∑
i=1
Yi
(
− γ
i∑
j=1
Yi − γX0 + β(Yi)
)
= −
∫ T
0
Xt dP
0
t +
γ
2
X20 +
∫ T
0
f(ξt) dt− γ
2
Nρ∑
i=1
Y 2i +
Nρ∑
i=1
Yiβ(Yi)
≥ −
∫ T
0
Xt dP
0
t +
γ
2
X20 +
∫ T
0
f(ξt) dt,
where we have used (14) in the final step. Therefore,
E[ CT ] ≥ γ
2
X20 + E
[∫ T
0
f(ξt) dt
]
≥ 0.
This establishes (a).
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Proof of Proposition 4.7. Let X0 ∈ R and α = 1, β = 0. Using (33) and Lemma 6.1, one finds that
the costs of any admissible strategy χ = (X̂,Ξ, ξ, ρ) ∈ X (X0, T ) are given by
CχT = −
∫ T
0
Xt dP
0
t +
γ
2
X20 +
∫ T
0
f(ξt) dt− γ
2
Nρ∑
i=1
Y 2i +
Nρ∑
i=1
Yiκh(ξτi).
Consider the following strategy with ρ = T2 , Ξ = 0, X̂ 6= 0, and
ξt =
{
0, if 0 ≤ t ≤ ρ,
−2X0+ZρT , if ρ < t ≤ T.
The expected costs of this strategy are
E[ CT ] = γ
2
X20 + E
[
T
2
f
(
−2X0 + ZT/2
T
)]
− γ
2
E
[ NT/2∑
i=1
Y 2i
]
=
γ
2
X20 − E
[ (
X0 + ZT/2
)
h
(
−2X0 + ZT/2
T
)]
− γ
2
E
[ NT/2∑
i=1
Y 2i
]
.
Note that |ZT/2| is bounded by |X̂ | for all T and that Yi is nonzero only as long as |
∑i−1
j=1 Y˜j| <
|X̂|. Hence, with probability one, only finitely many Yi are nonzero. Therefore, and by dominated
convergence,
lim
T↑∞
E[ CT ] = γ
2
X20 −
γ
2
E
[ ∞∑
i=1
Y 2i
]
.
When sending |X̂ | to infinity, ∑∞i=1 Y 2i tends to infinity with probability one. Hence, we can make
limT↑∞ E[ CT ] arbitrarily negative. So we can find a sequence of strategies χn ∈ X (X0, Tn) such that
E[ CχnT ] ≤ −n which implies the assertion.
Proof of Proposition 4.8. In the first step, we show that there is no price manipulation when κ = 0,
h(x) = ηx, and T ≤ 2η/γ. To this end, take any admissible round trip χ = (X̂,Ξ, ξ, ρ) ∈ X (0, T ).
Lemma 6.1 and (33) yield that the costs of χ are given by
CχT = −
∫ T
0
Xt dP
0
t +
γ
2
( Nρ∑
i=1
Yi
)2
+ η
∫ T
0
ξ2t dt+ γ
Nρ∑
i=1
Yi
(
(1− α)
∫ τi
0
ξs ds− α
i∑
j=1
Yj
)
= −
∫ T
0
Xt dP
0
t + α
(
η
∫ T
0
ξ2t dt−
γ
2
Nρ∑
i=1
Y 2i
)
+(1− α)
(
η
∫ T
0
ξ2t dt+ γ
Nρ∑
i=1
Yi
∫ τi
0
ξs ds+
γ
2
( Nρ∑
i=1
Yi
)2)
.
Note that
η
∫ T
0
ξ2t dt ≥
η
T
(∫ T
0
ξt dt
)2
=
η
T
( Nρ∑
i=1
Yi
)2
≥ η
T
Nρ∑
i=1
Y 2i ,
where we have used Jensen’s inequality in the first step and the fact that all Yi have the same sign in
the third. Thus,
γ
2
Nρ∑
i=1
Y 2i − η
∫ T
0
ξ2t dt ≤
(γ
2
− η
T
) Nρ∑
i=1
Y 2i . (34)
20
Furthermore, let Γ := supt∈[0,T ] |
∫ t
0 ξs ds|. Then, by Jensen’s inequality,∫ T
0
ξ2t dt ≥
1
T
(∫ T
0
ξt dt
)2
≥ Γ
2
T
.
We can estimate
η
∫ T
0
ξ2t dt+ γ
Nρ∑
i=1
Yi
∫ τi
0
ξs ds ≥ ηΓ
2
T
− γ
Nρ∑
i=1
|Yi|Γ.
As a function of Γ, the right-hand side becomes minimal when
Γ =
γT
2η
Nρ∑
i=1
|Yi|.
Therefore,
η
∫ T
0
ξ2t dt+ γ
Nρ∑
i=1
Yi
∫ τi
0
ξs ds+
γ
2
( Nρ∑
i=1
Yi
)2
≥ γ
2
( Nρ∑
i=1
|Yi|
)2(
1− γT
2η
)
. (35)
Combining (34) and (35) yields
CT ≥ −
∫ T
0
Xt dP
0
t − α
(γ
2
− η
T
) Nρ∑
i=1
Y 2i + (1− α)
γ
2
( Nρ∑
i=1
|Yi|
)2(
1− γT
2η
)
≥
∫ T
0
Xt dP
0
t
for T ≤ 2η/γ and we find E[ CT ] ≥ 0. This proves that there is no price manipulation for T ≤ 2η/γ.
In the second step of the proof, we show that for κ = 0, h(x) = ηx, α = 1 there is price manipulation
when T > 2η/γ. To construct a corresponding price manipulation strategy, take ε ∈ (0, T ) for which
γ
2
− η
T − ε > 0.
Now we consider a round trip χ with ρ = τ1 ∧ ε, Ξ = 0, arbitrary X̂ 6= 0, and
ξt =
{
− Y1T−ε , if t > ε and τ1 ≤ ε,
0, otherwise.
The expected costs of this strategy are
E[ CχT ] =
(
η
T − ε −
γ
2
)
E[Y 21 ; τ1 ≤ ε ] < 0.
Hence, χ is a price manipulation strategy.
Proof of Proposition 4.9. Let T > 0 and fix X̂ such that
γ
2
X̂2 − T
2
f
(
2
X̂
T
)
=
X̂2
2
(
γ − h(2X̂/T )
X̂
)
> 0,
which is possible due to the sublinearity of h. We take Ξ = |X̂ | and let
σ := inf{τk |Yk = X̂} = inf{τk | Y˜k ≥ Ξ}.
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Recall that the (Y˜k) form an i.i.d. sequence of random variables, which are unbounded from above.
Therefore, and by the standard thinning argument for Poisson processes, σ is exponentially distributed
with a parameter λ ∈ (0, θ]. Now we take ρ = T/2 and
ξt :=

0, t ≤ ρ,
0, t > ρ and σ > ρ,
−2X̂/T, t > ρ and σ ≤ ρ.
The expected costs of the strategy χ = (X̂,Ξ, ξ, ρ) are
E[ CχT ] = E
[ ∫ T
0
f(ξt) dt
]
−
∫ ρ
0
λe−λt
γ
2
X̂2 dt
= (1− e−λρ)
(
T
2
f
(
2
X̂
T
)
− γ
2
X̂2
)
< 0.
So there is price manipulation.
Now we prove the results pertaining to the assumptions that α = β = κ = 0 and h(ξ) = ηξ. Under
these conditions, Lemma 6.1 yields that for any admissible strategy χ = (X̂,Ξ, ξ, ρ),
CχT = −
∫ T
0
Xt dP
0
t +
γ
2
(
X0 +
Nρ∑
i=1
Yi
)2
+ η
∫ T
0
ξ2t dt+
Nρ∑
i=1
Yi
(
γ
∫ τi
0
ξs ds
)
. (36)
Proof of Proposition 4.10. Proof of (a): Take ρ = T2 and
ξt =

− γ2η X̂, if t ≤ τ1, t ≤ ρ,
0, if t > τ1, t ≤ ρ
−Xρ+ρ , if t > ρ,
where X̂ will be specified later. By (36), we find that the costs of χ = (X̂, 0, ξ, ρ) are
CχT = −
∫ T
0
Xt dP
0
t +
γ
2
(
X0 +
Nρ∑
i=1
Yi
)2
+ η(ρ ∧ τ1) γ
2
4η2
X̂2 + η
X2ρ+
ρ
−
Nρ∑
i=1
Yiτ1
γ2
2η
X̂.
In the limit T ↑ ∞ we will have
Nρ∑
i=1
Yi =
NT/2∑
i=1
Yi −→ X̂.
Hence, using the fact that E[ τ1 ] =
1
θ ,
lim
T↑∞
E[ CχT ] =
γ
2
(X0 + X̂)
2 − 1
θ
γ2
4η
X̂2. (37)
Choosing
X̂ = − 2X0ηθ
γ − 2ηθ
yields
lim
T↑∞
E[ CχT ] = −
γ
2
2
X20
1
2ηθ − γ < 0.
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This concludes the proof of part (a).
Proof of (b): We first consider the case in which γηθ = 2 and X0 6= 0. With the same strategy χ as
in part (a) we find with (37) that
lim
T↑∞
E[ CχT ] =
γ
2
X20 + γX0X̂.
For X0 6= 0, the right-hand side can be made arbitrarily negative by taking X̂ with the opposite sign
of X0 and making |X̂| large.
Now we consider the case in which γηθ > 2. With (37) we find
lim
T↑∞
E[ CχT ] =
γ
2
X20 + γX0X̂ − εX̂2,
where ε > 0. Again, the right-hand side can be made arbitrarily negative by sending X̂ to infinity.
Proof of Proposition 4.11. In view of Proposition 4.10, the assertion will be implied by the following
claim: If, for 0 ≤ t < ρ, we have ξt ≤ 0 when X0 > 0 or ξt ≥ 0 when X0 < 0, then E[ CT ] ≥ 0. In
proving this claim, we will consider the case X0 > 0. The case X0 < 0 is analogous. With Lemma 6.1
we find that for any admissible strategy χ = (X̂,Ξ, ξ, ρ) ∈ X (X0, T ),
CχT = −
∫ T
0
Xt dP
0
t +
γ
2
(
X0 +
Nρ∑
i=1
Yi
)2
+
∫ T
0
f(ξt) dt+
Nρ∑
i=1
Yiγ
∫ τi
0
ξs ds.
Consider first the case X̂ ≤ 0. Then
Nρ∑
i=1
Yiγ
∫ τi
0
ξs ds ≥ 0
and E[ CχT ] ≥ 0 follows.
Consider next the case X̂ > 0. Since ξt ≤ 0 this implies Xt ≥ 0 for all t. Especially, Xτi− ≥ 0, or
equivalently, ∫ τi
0
ξs ds ≥ −X0 −
i−1∑
j=1
Yi.
Therefore, we find that
CχT ≥ −
∫ T
0
Xt dP
0
t +
γ
2
X20 +
1
2
γ
Nρ∑
i=1
Y 2i +
∫ T
0
f(ξt) dt
and E[ CχT ] ≥ 0 follows.
Proof of Proposition 4.12. Under the assumption µ = δ∞, the entire dark-pool order X̂ is is filled at
τ1. Therefore, the costs of a strategy χ ∈ X (X0, T ) are
CχT = −
∫ T
0
Xt dP
0
t +
γ
2
(X0 + 1{τ1≤ρ}X̂)
2 + η
∫ T
0
ξ2t dt+ 1{τ1≤ρ}γX̂(Xτ1− −X0)
≥ −
∫ T
0
Xt dP
0
t + 1{τ1≤ρ}
(
γ
2
(X0 + X̂)
2 + η
(Xτ1− −X0)2
τ1
+ γX̂(Xτ1− −X0)
)
,
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where we have applied Jensen’s inequality to the integral
∫ τ1
0 ξ
2
t dt, which is less than or equal to∫ T
0 ξ
2
t dt. As a function of Xτ1−, the rightmost expression is minimized by
Xτ1− = X0 −
γ
2η
τ1X̂,
and so
CχT ≥ −
∫ T
0
Xt dP
0
t + 1{τ1<ρ}
(
γ
2
(X0 + X̂)
2 − γ
2
4η
τ1X̂
2
)
. (38)
Thus,
E[ CχT ] ≥ E[ψ(ρ, X̂) ],
where
ψ(ρ, X̂) :=
∫ ρ
0
θe−θt
(
γ
2
(X0 + X̂)
2 − γ
2
4η
tX̂2
)
dt.
We see that ψ(0, X̂) = 0 and the term in parentheses is decreasing in t for X̂ 6= 0. Therefore, if X̂ is
such that ψ(∞, X̂) < 0, then we have ψ(ρ, X̂) ≥ ψ(∞, X̂) for all ρ <∞. For X̂ with ψ(∞, X̂) ≥ 0 we
have ψ(ρ, X̂) ≥ 0 for all ρ <∞. Thus,
E[ CχT ] ≥ 0 ∧ ψ(∞, X̂) = −
(γ
2
(X0 + X̂)
2 − γ
2
4ηθ
X̂2
)−
.
The right-hand side is minimized by taking
X̂ = 2X0
ηθ
γ − 2ηθ ,
and so
E[ CχT ] ≥ −
γ2
2
X20
1
2ηθ − γ .
The assertion now follows with part (a) of Proposition 4.10.
Proof of Corollary 4.13. We already know from Proposition 4.10 (b) that there is price manipulation
for γη > 2θ. On the other hand, Proposition 4.12 implies that there is no price manipulation for
γ
η < 2θ. Hence, it remains to analyze the case
γ
η = 2θ. For a round trip χ ∈ X (0, T ), our estimate
(38) yields that
CχT ≥ −
∫ T
0
Xt dP
0
t + 1{τ1<ρ}γ
(
1
2
− γ
4η
τ1
)
X̂2.
Hence,
E[ CχT ] ≥ γX̂2E[ g(ρ) ]
where
g(ρ) :=
∫ ρ
0
θe−θt
(
1
2
− γ
4η
t
)
dt =
1
2
(1− e−θρ)− γ
4ηθ
(
1− e−θρ(1 + θρ)
)
=
1
2
θρe−θρ ≥ 0.
This gives E[ CχT ] ≥ 0.
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Proof of Proposition 4.15. Under the assumptions α = 1, β(y) = γ2y, and κ = 0, the costs of an
admissible strategy χ ∈ X (X0, T ) are given by
CχT = −
∫ T
0
Xt dP
0
t +
γ
2
(
X0 + 1{τ1≤ρ}X̂
)2
+
∫ T
0
f(ξt) dt− γX̂
(
1
2
X̂ +X0
)
1{τ1≤ρ}
= −
∫ T
0
Xt dP
0
t +
γ
2
X20 +
∫ T
0
f(ξt) dt.
Taking the conditional expectation with respect to Fτ1∧ρ and using optional sampling yields
E[ CχT | Fτ1∧ρ ] = −
∫ τ1∧ρ
0
Xt dP
0
t +
γ
2
X20 +
∫ τ1∧ρ
0
f(ξt) dt+ E
[ ∫ T
τ1∧ρ
f(ξt) dt
∣∣Fτ1∧ρ ].
Due to the liquidation constraint, we must have
∫ T
τ1∧ρ ξt dt = −Xτ1∧ρ−1{τ1<ρ}X̂, and so the convexity
of f and Jensen’s inequality yield that∫ T
τ1∧ρ
f(ξt) dt ≥ (T − τ1 ∧ ρ)f
(−Xτ1∧ρ − 1{τ1<ρ}X̂
T − τ1 ∧ ρ
)
with equality if, for τ1 ∧ ρ ≤ t ≤ T ,
ξt =

−Xτ1 − X̂
T − τ1 on {τ1 ≤ ρ},
−Xρ
T − ρ on {ρ < τ1}.
(39)
These two possibilities will correspond to the single update of the optimal strategy at τ1.
Note next that, due to the (Gt)-predictability of the processes (ξt) and (ρ∧ t)t≥0, (ξs)s≤t and ρ∧ t
are independent of τ1, conditional on {t ≤ τ1}. It follows that
E[ CχT ] = E[E[ CχT | Fτ1∧ρ ] ]
≥ γ
2
X20 + E
[ ∫ τ1∧ρ
0
f(ξt) dt+ (T − τ1 ∧ ρ)f
(−Xτ1∧ρ − 1{τ1≤ρ}X̂
T − τ1 ∧ ρ
) ]
=
γ
2
X20 + E
[
F (X̂, ξ, ρ)
]
, (40)
where the functional F maps X̂ ∈ R, ξ ∈ L1[0, T ], and r ∈ [0, T ] to
F (X̂, ξ, r) =
∫ ∞
0
du θe−θu
{∫ u∧r
0
f(ξt) dt+ (T − u ∧ r)f
(−X0 − ∫ u∧r0 ξt dt− 1{u≤r}X̂
T − u ∧ r
)}
.
When F admits a minimizer (X̂∗, ξ∗, r∗), then concatenating ξ∗ with (39) in r∗ ∧ τ1 yields an optimal
strategy that is a single-update strategy.
To show the existence of a minimizer of F , take any triple (X˜, ξ˜, r˜) for which C := F (X˜, ξ˜, r˜) <∞.
We then only need to look into those triples (X̂, ξ, r) for which F (X̂, ξ, r) ≤ C. Without loss of
generality, we can pick the component ξ from the set
KC :=
{
ξ ∈ L1[0, T ]
∣∣∣ ∫ T
0
f(ξt) dt ≤ CeθT
}
,
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because
F (X̂, ξ, r) ≥
∫ ∞
T
du θe−θu
∫ u∧r
0
f(ξt) dt = e
−θT
∫ r
0
f(ξt) dt
and we can set ξt := 0 for t > r.
The set KC is a closed convex subset of L
1[0, T ]. Hence it is also weakly closed in L1[0, T ]. It is also
uniformly integrable according to the criterion of de la Valle´e Poussin and the superlinear growth of f ,
which follows from our assumption that |h(x)| → ∞ as |x| → ∞. Hence, the Dunford–Pettis theorem
(Dunford and Schwartz, 1958, Corollary IV.8.11) implies that KC is weakly sequentially compact in
L1[0, T ]. From now on we will endow KC with the weak topology.
It follows in particular that
sup
ξ∈KC
∫ T
0
|ξt| dt <∞. (41)
Since
F (X̂, ξ, r) ≥
∫ r
0
du θe−θu(T − u)f
(−X0 − ∫ u0 ξt dt− X̂
T − u
)
,
the superlinear growth of f and (41) imply that there is a constant C1 ≥ 0 such that |X̂ | ≤ C1 when
F (X̂, ξ, r) ≤ C. Hence we can restrict our search of a minimizer to the sequentially compact set
K := [−C1, C1]×KC × [0, T ].
Next,
[0, T ] ×KC ∋ (r, ξ) −→
∫ r
0
ξt dt =
∫ T
0
ξt1[0,r](t) dt
is a continuous map. Moreover, denoting by f∗ the Fenchel-Legendre transform of the finite convex
function f , we have f∗∗ = f due to the biduality theorem, and so
[0, T ]×KC ∋ (r, ξ) 7−→
∫ r
0
f(ξt) dt = sup
ϕ∈L∞
[ ∫ T
0
1[0,r](t)ξtϕt dt−
∫ r
0
f∗(ϕt) dt
]
;
see, e.g., Theorem 2 in Rockafellar (1968). It follows that this map is lower semicontinuous as the
supremum of continuous maps.
Altogether, it follows that F is lower semicontinuous on the sequentially compact set K and so
admits a minimizer.
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